Contemporary Challenges for Confucianism by Li, Chenyang
 
Journal of East-West Thought 
 
F I V E C O N T E MPO R A R Y C H A L L E N G ES F O R 




Abstract: In this essay I will discuss five major challenges faced by Confucianism 
in recent times. Two of these challenges have been widely acknowledged, namely 
science has been largely solved, even though more constructive work would further 
strengthen Confucianism in this regard. The problem of democracy is still being 
dealt with. I will examine three more major challenges. The third major challenge 
for Confucianism comes from environmentalism. Confucianism has taken note of its 
important message and has begun to respond to it. The fourth major challenge is 
the feminist challenge. Even though contemporary Confucianism accepts sexual 
equality, philosophically significant progress is yet to be made. The final challenge 
assaults in the 20th 
lf into the future.  
 
IN THIS ESSAY I will discuss five major challenges faced by Confucianism in 
recent times. These are not only challenges to Confucianism, but also challenges for 
Confucianism, in the sense that they do not only raise problems for Confucianism to 
tackle but also provide opportunities for Confucianism to renew itself. Two of these 
challenges have been widely acknowledged, namely those of science and democracy. 
In addition, I will call attention to three more major challenges. I believe that 
constructive work would further strengthen Confucianism in this regard. The problem 
of democracy is still being dealt with. The third major challenge for Confucianism 
comes from environmentalism. Confucianism has taken note of its important message 
and has begun to respond to that challenge. The fourth major challenge is the feminist 
challenge. Even though contemporary Confucianism accepts sexual or gender 
equality, philosophically significant progress is yet to be made. The final challenge, 
periods in history, Confucianism must now find new ways to continue into the future. 
In the following, I will first examine how contemporary Confucian scholars have 
handled the problem of science; then I will examine the current status of the problem 
of democracy and will propose a solution to it. Furthermore, I will discuss the 




                                                 
1 There is a vast amount of literature on the subjects covered in this paper. Due to limited space, 
I will quote contemporary Confucian thinkers only when necessary. 
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In my view, the problem of science and Confucianism includes two issues. The first 
has to do with how Confucianism defines the nature of science and articulates its own 
epistemology of science. The second concerns the value assigned to science in the 
Confucian value framework. This involves how Confucianism assesses the value of 
science in its own philosophical system as well as its general attitude toward science.  
Confucianism has not always looked at science fair-mindedly. To be sure, Confucius 
was not superstitious, and he stayed away from speculating about superstitious forces 
(子不語怪力亂神, Analects, 7:20 ). But his main interest was not the empirical or 
technical aspects of the natural world. When a student asked him an agricultural 
question, his reaction was negative. (Analects, 13:4) Among early Confucian thinkers, 
Xunzi 荀子  (fl. 298-238 BCE) was probably the only one who had a naturalist 
tendency --a move that could have assigned natural science a larger role in the 
Confucian philosophical system. Xunzi believed that it is human nature to learn and 
to conjecture, and that what we learn and know is the principle or nature of things (凡
以知人之性也 ,可以知物之理也).2 However, mainstream Confucian thought has 
concentrated on moralistic worldviews (this is true even with Xunzi). It focuses on 
moral value as the core of the cosmos and centers human existence within the moral 
domain. Confucius explicitly defined true knowledge as knowledge about human 
affairs rather than the natural world (Analects, 12:22). In the Analects, one can hardly 
find anything on knowledge in the naturalist world. This moralistic attitude was later 
reflected in the neo-Confucian 张载 1020-1078) formulation of the 
dexing zhizhi 德性之知
jianwen suozhi 见闻所知
ses (dexing suozhi, bumeng 
yu jianwen 德性所知不萌于见闻 3  
Zhu Xi (朱熹  1130-1200) was the second major figure after Xun Zi in the 
Confucian tradition to attempt to elevate the status of knowledge about the natural 
gewu zhizhi 格物致知
Daxue Liji 禮記. Daxue
Zhongyong, -nine chapters of 
the Liji gewu 
zhizhi
li,
be known by examining them. He evidently had a holistic view of the world and saw 
a direct connection between empirical knowledge of the world and moral knowledge. 
gewu zhizhi
gewu ral 
                                                 
2 Xun Zi: Jiebi ( 解蔽).  
3 Zhang Zai also believes that knowledge through the senses can contribute to acquiring moral 
knowledge. But Zhang seems to have kept it to the minimum. 
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world about us, he at least opened a door to possible scientific knowledge. 
Presumably, the investigation of things could lead to scientific knowledge of the 
empirical world.    
Confucian thinker Wang Yangming (王阳明 1472-1529). Zhu was at least partially to 
blame for this reversal because he saw too direct of a connection between empirical 
knowledge of the world and moral knowledge. Also, his understanding of the 
investigation of things was too superficial. Wang i
gewu zhizhi li from bamboos in his own yard. 
Wang failed miserably because he could not find any li through diligent observation 
of the bamboo. He subsequently changed course and claimed that all useful 
knowledge is to be found within the heart/mind; there is no need to look outside the 
It failed to assign 
adequate value to the pursuit of knowledge in the natural world. This traditional 
obsession with searches for immortal substances at least helped indirectly to enhance 
human knowledge of the natural world; over time the traditional Confucian obsession 
with the classics, most notably in the form of preparation for the civil service 
examinations, actually degraded the pursuit of scientific knowledge. 
This unflattering attitude toward scientific knowledge about the natural world has 
science started to gain more ground in Chinese society in the early 20th century, 
Confucian thinkers have tried to preserve the territory of traditional philosophy by 
separating science and philosophy into two realms. For example, as early as 1905 
Liang Qichao 梁启超 dao xue (道学 Confucian moral 
 (Zheng, 30). During the debate between 
Ke-Xuan Lunzhan 科玄论战) in the 1920s, defenders of 
 approach in order to preserve room for 
traditional philosophy. Feng Youlan 冯友兰 declared that science itself is neither 
moral nor immoral. (Feng,1993, 252) For Feng, although there are moral principles in 
the universe, the universe itself is not a moral one. That is to say, while there are 
moral principles in human society, the natural world is neither moral nor immoral. 
This is a major break from the Song-Ming neo-Confucians, who hold that there is the 
same moral principle (dao or li) throughout the entire 
significant; if the natural world is amoral, scientific research of the natural world 
would not need to justify itself on the basis of its immediate contribution to moral 
advancement. Science should be given its own independent status. 
It is Mou Zongsan (牟宗三 1909-1995), however, who made the most important 
considerably expanded Confucianism to include scientific knowledge. His 
contribution is evidenced mostly in his theory of the nature of scientific knowledge. 
Mou believes that traditional Confucian culture failed to give adequate recognition to 
zhi xing 知性 Characteristics of 
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Chinese Culture (中国文化的特质 Zhongguo Wenhua de Tezhi) and other works, 
Mou argues that in order to embrace both science and democracy, the spirit of 
坎陷  kan xian) the mode of zhi xing. 
synthetic approach to 
comprehending li 综合的尽理之精神  zonghe de jinli zhi 
jinsheng). It emphasizes comprehensiveness, holism, and thorough connection. Its l i 
is about the moral world (or the moral aspect of the world), not the natural world (or 
the natural aspect of the world); it is about practice, not cognition or theory. It focuses 
on the world of value, rather than the world of reality (实然世界 shiran shijie, the 
factual world).4 Western culture, as represented by the Greek tradition, focuses on the 
comprehending li 分解的尽理之精神  fenjie de jinli zhi jinsheng). It is abstract, 
str 方方正正  fangfang zhengzheng), and it defines the world through 
differentiation (层层限定  cengceng xianding). 5  This spirit is centered on logic, 
-
values the li of being (1992, 40). Mou believes that this analytical spirit has produced 
science and Christianity in the West. 
Drawing up on this analysis, Mou concludes that, in order to embrace science, 
Chinese culture needs to (through self-negation) incorporate the mode of 
zhi xing) into its culture. Whether Mou is accurate on his account of 
these cultures may be debatable. I believe he is nevertheless right in maintaining that 
li
Scientific knowledge cannot grow without empirical and analytical approaches. 
th 
and 19th centuries. German idealism generally divides epistemology into three modes, 
namely experience, understanding, and reason. Chinese tradition has not valued the 
mode of experience (experiment) and understanding (i.e., analytical method) enough 
to encourage these sorts of learning. Instead, it has valued, even overvalued, a 
synthetic comprehension of rational knowledge of the world and of human affairs.  
scientific knowledge makes good sense. In my view, he has produced a good solution 
to the science problem for Confucianism. However, a fully developed Confucian view 
of science remains to be clearly articulated. Confucianism needs not only to justify its 
own existence by securing adequate territories from science; it also needs to develop 
its own version of a philosophy of science. It needs to articulate the role of science 
and scientific knowledge in the human journey to moral refinement. On the one hand, 
Confucianism must recognize that the connection of science to the moral life is not 
always direct and immediate. To the contrary, for the most part, this connection is 
indirect and intermediate; science has to maintain its own independence. One the 
other hand, Confucianism must reserve its right to educate society that the most 
                                                 
4 Mou, (1992), 35-36. 
5 Ibid. 39. 
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important thing is to lead a good life. Science, as well as any other human activity, 




democracy is grossly inadequate. He argues that the spirit of the analytical approach 
to comprehending li has also produced democracy in the West. Democracy, according 
to Mou, relies on two conditions. Firstly, it pre-supposes external limitations and 
oppositions to the individual. Secondly, it pursues justice through competition 
between opposing social classes, and it establishes objective rules and regulations in 
both conditions are traced back to the Western analytical approach. The first 
condition for democracy is to recognize external limitations; the second condition is 
based on an abstract, conceptual attitude toward objects. In a word, Western 
democracy is established on its analytical spirit or zhi xing (Mou,1992, 42-3). 
n zhi xing and democracy is 
speculative and seriously flawed. The analytical mode that Mou finds in the West 
separate existence outside of oneself. But this recognition at most puts forth a 
question about how one should cope with other individuals. It does not provide an 
ence, one 
could either attempt to conquer them, or to coexist with them, or to make deals with 
them, or something else. Democracy is one of many possible answers to the question 
of how one copes with individuals in society. The analytical approach to the world is 
typically a logical and hence a linear approach. Democracy is based on plurality 
instead of singularity; it requires a non-linear approach. Understanding or zhi xing is 
not adequate in grasping the spirit of democracy. Democracy demands reason and 
only begins the process of searching for solutions; it is not in itself a solution.  
Shu-hsien Liu, a leading contemporary Confucian thinker, evidently has 
recognized the inad
proposed a resolution by reinterpreting the neo-
理一分殊  liyi fenshu). He maintains that the most 
profound aspect of Chinese culture, including Confucianism, Buddhism or Daoism, 
两行 liang xing). 
Liang xing Zhuangzi 庄子. Zhuangzi maintains that, from the 
perspective of the Dao, everything in the world is ultimately the same and can be 
traced back to the same source. Therefore, the right (是 shi 否 
fou oncludes that, if one understands 
the Dao, one will not be obsessed with the right and the wrong of a thing, and will see 
beyond them letting both tracks proceed. Liu maintains that this traditional 
liang xing d neglects difference. 
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li yi) on 
fen shu) on the other. Letting both tracks 
proceed reveals a good balance of these two aspects (Liu (1992), 549). That is to say 
we need to pursue the all-comprehensive and all-penetrating Dao, and alternatively, 
we need to recognize that the Dao has many manifestations, and all of them are 
rooted in the same foundation. The realization that the Dao has various manifestations 
leaves room for pluralism. Accordingly, one may argue that, for Confucianism, even 
though there is only one moral ideal of ren (Humanity), it can be manifested in many 
ways. Therefore, under the same principle, there is room for different opinions and 
different practices. 
Plurality is indispensable to democracy. Liu recognizes the value of plurality 
within democracy and attempts to open space for plurality within Confucianism. His 
move is a major step forward from Mou Zongsan. It points in a new direction and 
provides a new approach to solving the problem of democracy for Confucianism. 
However, there are still unanswered questions. As a value system, Confucianism 
has to answer questions on two levels. The first has to do with whether Confucianism 
recognizes the legitimacy of the existence of different opinions on an issue. The 
second has to do with where Confucianism itself stands on various issues of 
the 
Confucianism is to move away from its traditional obsession with unity (大一统 da 
yi tong  (Liu, 1992, 259. In other words, Confucianism 
now recognizes the legitimacy of others making un-Confucian claims. However, as a 
particular value system, Confucianism has to maintain its own stance on what values 
are important. It has to promote certain prioritizations of values and oppose others. 
one hand, and individual autonomy and freedom on the other. Between these two, 
liberal democratic value systems lean toward the latter, whereas Confucianism has 
leaned toward the former.  
Here there are two pluralistic positions that Confucianism can choose from. The 
first one is an internal pluralistic position. This is the position that allows various 
values, including opposing values, to prevail within its value system. In such a way, it 
not only endorses the one principle of liyi, but also endorses equally its many 
manifestations as well, as long as these manifestations are considere
second approach is an external pluralistic approach. On this latter approach, 
Confucianism endorses the principle of liyi fenshu, but discriminates between various 
prioritizations of values that are generally considered good, and prioritizes its own 
core values. 
If Confucians are to follow an internal pluralist approach, they would have to 
emphasize both ends of some contending values, They would have to say, for 
instance, 
prioritized, and on the other, so should individual autonomy and freedom be 
prioritized. In reality, this approach amounts to no prioritization. This move would 
bring Confucianism close to the kind of materialist dialectics that has been popular in 
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China in the last century. This position may sound good. But it involves a self-
-
same time. One has to ask, what does Confucianism really stand for? While some 
contemporary Confucian thinkers attempt to conciliate Confucianism with 
attempt to make Confucianism everything (e.g., both for group loyalty and for 
individual liberty), they have made Confuc - 6 
While Confucianism struggles with the first question, it also needs to take the 
second question seriously. It must not forget what it stands for as a particular value 
system. A value system disseminates moral values. Namely, it prescribes to its 
followers whether one should subscribe to a certain value and, if yes, how much 
importance or priority one should give to it with respect to other values. For example, 
should one subscribe to the moral value of filial piety or of loyalty or of individual 
freedom? If there is a tension or conflict between two moral values one subscribes to, 
how much weight should one give to each? Due to the tension or conflict between 
these values, assigning more importance to one entails giving less importance to the 
other or others. Valuing filial piety more entails assigning less room for individual 
other (relatively) less.  
In both traditional Confucianism and liberal democracy (as value systems) one 
can find the value of loyalty and that of individual freedom, the value of unity and 
s social duties, and 
that of individual autonomy and that of responsible paternalism; but as value systems 
they configure these values differently. Confucianism assigns more importance than 
liberal democracy does to the values of loyalty, unity, duties to society, and 
responsible paternalism. Facing a conflict between these values within each pair 
mentioned above, Confucianism tends to stand more for the values of loyalty, unity, 
duty, and responsible paternalism than their counterparts, even though it does not 
outright reject their counterparts. On the other hand, the value system of liberal 
democracy tends to stand more for the values of individual freedom, diversity, 
individual rights, and individual autonomy than Confucianism does.  
Because Confucianism and liberal democracy assign differing emphasis to their 
values, the two will continue to have tensions or even conflicts on some issues. A 
healthy modern society should have different value systems vying over their 
audience. The tension between Confucianism and liberal democracy will help 




I I I 
                                                 
6 i (2007). 
7 For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Li (1999), 163-190. 
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The third major challenge to Confucianism comes from environmentalism. 
Environmentalism challenges various world traditions for their lack of adequate 
concern for the natural environment; it demands that philosophy and religion take 
seriously the ethical relation of human beings to the natural environment. To be sure, 
there are rich resources in the Confucian tradition to meet this demand; one can think 
of ideas regarding the balance of yin and yang, and ideas about the inseparability of 
humanity from the rest of the world in the Book of Changes 易經 and particularly in 
Song-Ming neo-Confucianism. It remains nevertheless a fact that mainstream 
Confucianism in practice has been largely anthropocentric, and to a large extent is at 
odds with contemporary environmentalism.  
Analects 论语 for example. Although the Analects does not 
deal with the environment directly, it contains passages in regard to animals that at 
least indicate a lack of concern for them, such as one would also find in the Old 
Testament. For instance, Section 10.12 of the Analects records an instance when 
home, Confucius asked if any 
people were injured. The passage specifically says that Confucius did not ask 
anything about the horses. This story purports to tell us how humane Confucius was 
important. Indeed, if Confucius had been eager to know if his horses (property) were 
damaged, he would have seemed selfish and inhumane. However, by tod
standards, one may have to say that Confucius did not show enough concern for 
disciple Zi Gong wanted to spare the sacrificial sheep at the monthly ritual. 
Confucius, with a tone of disapproval, said that while Zi Gong loved the animal, he 
himself loved the ritual, implying that, for the sake of the integrity of the ritual, the 
he did not show adequate concern for the lives or the wellbeing of animals, not to 
mention any concern for non-animated natural objects, even though he was clearly 
concerned about the quality and integrity of the sacrificial rituals.  
Other classic Confucian thinkers have also held an attitude which may be 
interpreted as detrimental to the environment. For example, Xunzi 荀 子 presented a 
naturalistic interpretation of Heaven (tian 天), making it a totality of all natural 
phenomena. He advocated that human beings should exert control over the natural 
environment, and put it for our use (制天命而用之 tian to serve our 
-1626) in the West 
verpowering and 
manipulating nature has exerted a largely negative impact on the environment.  
people of ancient times. Confucius may or may not have been guilty of these charges. 
However, the fact remains that the Analects provides nothing or little that can be used 
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to construct an environmentally friendly philosophy.8 Unfortunately, over the long 
history of Confucian influence in China, the influence of the Analects on ordinary 
p
Confucian classics such as the Book of Changes, the Shang Shu, and even the 
Zhongyong.   
Today the environment poses serious challenges to every world tradition. It can 
be argued, however, that in comparison with Daoism and Buddhism, the challenge to 
Confucianism is greater. One fundamental characteristic of Daoism is its doctrine of 
staying close to nature and following the flow of nature. It can be readily construed to 
be an environmentally friendly philosophy, regardless of its actual practice in history. 
One cardinal Buddhist virtue is frugality. Buddhism shares with Daoism the belief in 
a simple life without promoting accumulation of wealth. While thrifty is a virtue in 
Confucianism, Confucians also value economic success and family prosperity. This 
economic orientation itself is not necessarily detrimental to nature, but without 
adequate consideration to the environment, as has been the case in the past, 
Confucianism has not been a close friend to nature.  
In recent years, Confucian thinkers have attempted to meet the environmental 
challenge. In an effort to change the anthropocentric image of Confucianism, Tu 
Weiming has formulated Confucianism to be anthropocosmic and argued that implicit 
chün-tzu [jun zi, 
the morally cultivated person], so conceived, expresses the idea of humans as co-
creators of the universe. As a co-creator, the paradigmatic human is an initiator, a 
 (Tu, 1993, 53). 
successful, may help Confucianism to meet the environmental challenge. Chung-ying 
Cheng, another leading Confucian scholar, has attempted to articulate an 
of the Tao and the 
Chinese p
9 based on the relational pattern of 
the Book of Changes, Cheng articulated a specific Confucian view of the 
environment. He interp
a revival of this kind of relational and processive world outlook as a response to 
environmental changes.10  
Along this line of thinking, we can find abundant resources in Confucian classics 
-
                                                 
8 The Analects, however, records that Confucius exercised restraint with animals. He did not 
use a net as he fished with a fishing line, and he did not shoot at roosting birds even though he 
used a corded arrow (7:26). 
9 In Tucker and Berthrong (1998), 211-235. 
10 In recent years many scholars inside China have done much work in this area of research. 
Unfortunately, little has been introduced to the West. Tucker and Berthrong (1998) is a notable 
achievement in the English-speaking world on the study of Confucianism and the environment.  
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think of such works as the Book of Changes, the Shang Shu 尚書 (especially the 
chapter of Hong Fan 洪範), and the Zhongyong 中庸.  For example, the Zhongyong 
can fully realize the natures of other things. If one can fully realize the natures of 
other things, one can assist the transformation and production between Heaven and 
Earth; if one can assist the transformation and production between Heaven and Earth, 
one can form a triad with Heaven and Earth能盡人之性則能盡物之性，能盡物之
性則可以贊天地之化育；可以贊天地之化育則可以與天地參矣 (Section 22, my 
h as this one clearly draw a holistic picture of human 
beings and the environment, which provides a good basis for moving forward in an 
environmentally friendly direction. 
Today, Confucianism needs to reevaluate its own thinking and come up with a 
viable account of the relationship between human beings and the environment. But 
this is not as easy a task as one may think. For example, in certain ways, giving more 
weight to the natural environment entails taking something away from its traditional 
humanistic emphasis. Confucianism has to carefully decide how much to preserve, 
and how to preserve, its humanistic core.  
It may be useful to consider where Confucianism stands on the environment vis-
à-vis two environmental approaches developed in the West, i.e., conservationism and 
preservationism. Conservationists hold that only human beings have intrinsic value 
and the ultimate purpose of protecting the environment is to promote human welfare. 
Preservationists, on the other hand, hold that, in addition to its instrumental value, 
nature also has intrinsic value. Even though protecting the environment can benefit 
human beings, it is not the only reason for environmental protection (des Jardins, 1997, 
39). The key difference between conservationism and preservationism is the ultimate 
purpose of environmental protection. Conservationists hold that the purpose is to 
protect the environment from human exploitation so that human beings can receive 
greater long-term benefit from it. The benefit that the non-human world may get from 
this protection is just a by-product and in addition to the human benefit. 
Philosophically this view can be justified on the ground of anthropocentrism. 
Preservationists hold that, in addition to being beneficial to human beings, protecting 
the environment also benefits the non-human world, which also has intrinsic value. 
Therefore its benefit to the non-human world is not only an extra but an intrinsic part 
of environmental protection. This latter view is best justified on the basis of non-
anthropocentrism. Today, the preservationist view has grown into a full-fledged 
holistic environmental philosophy. According to this view, humans are merely a part 
of the entire ecological system, with no special privileges, and the right or wrong of 
our action affecting the environment is determined by whether the action tends to 
promote the overall health and integrity of the ecological system as a whole.     
If Confucianism follows and develops the humanistic and anthropocentric aspect 
of thinking as we found in the Analects, it could develop into a conservationist 
environmental philosophy. In this way, it may share a position on the environment 
environment because it is a gift from God for the ultimate benefit of humanity. 
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Conversely, if Confucianism follows a non-anthropocentric strand of philosophical 
thinking as we find in such classics as the Book of Changes, the Shang Shu, and the 
Zhongyong, it may become a holistic environmental philosophy. However, a 
Confucian holistic environmental philosophy may not be the same as its counterpart 
in the West. The Confucian holism as implied in the above-mentioned works includes 
three key aspects: namely, Heaven, Earth, and Humanity (天地人). 
should be understood to mean the universe beyond the earth. As humans extend our 
capacity to exert impact beyond the earth, this part of the triadic structure should be 
taken more seriously. On this Confucian triadic conception, while humans are not the 
center of the world, it is more than just one member in the animal kingdom. In other 
words, humans are not a mere member of the world community, not a mere member 
in equal status to other members. At the risk of being taken too literally, I would 
venture to say that, on this Confucian view, humans weigh about one third in this 
triadic universe beside Heaven and Earth. Thus, a Confucian holistic environmental 
philosophy may assign humanity a position in the universe that is considerably higher 
than is found in the holistic environmental philosophy developed in the West. A 
Confucian environmental philosophy may be somewhere between the typical 
conservationist approach and the typical preservationist approach. To be sure, such a 
philosophy is yet to be further developed or articulated, but I believe that its material 
can be found within the Confucian tradition. 
If Confucianism takes the non-anthropocentric approach and develops a holistic 
environmental philosophy, it still has another issue to deal with. This is the issue of 
translating theory into actual practice. Holmes Rolston (1987) made a point by 
arguing the relevance of a particular worldview to its effect on the environment has 
not only to do with the way one thinks about nature but, more importantly, the way 
one acts in relation to nature. This raises an important question, because the primary 
from the strand of Confucianism represented by the Analects, rather than the strand 
represented by the Book of Changes. Therefore, even if Confucianism takes the non-
anthropocentric approach and draws from such classics as the Book of Changes, it still 
aily practice. 
While this may not be an insurmountable task, one should not overlook this critical 
step in a Confucian environmental philosophy. Unfortunately, little attention seems to 
have been paid to this practical aspect. In order to develop a full-fledged Confucian 
environmental philosophy, Confucian thinkers have to engage in serious discussion 
on the issue. Any sensible, viable, and practical Confucian environmental philosophy 





The next issue is the feminist challenge to Confucianism. It is no secret that 
Confucianism carries a huge historical record of sexual discrimination against 
women. In order for it to move forward, Confucianism has to reshape its position with 
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respect to women. Contemporary Confucian thinkers have been slow in engaging in 
feminist/gender issues, even though they usually support sexual equality between men 
Mr. 
Mr. 
feminist concerns. A strange phenomenon has persisted: on the one hand feminist 
scholars have raised critical issues concerning Confucianism, particularly at some 
conferences of Confucianism, and on the other, few major Confucian thinkers have 
yet to take active steps to respond to these challenges. It seems that either these 
thinkers have not taken feminist challenges seriously or they have not taken steps to 
do in-depth study and to produce new thinking in this regard to fulfill the need. This 
situation has to change. 
One may think that the issue of sexual equality can be resolved as part of the 
issue of democracy. One may think that, for example, as Confucianism settles with 
democracy, it will automatically square well with feminism. This belief, however, is 
unfounded. Democracy may be helpful to the cause of feminism, but it does not 
automatically achieve equality between men and women. Ancient Athens was a 
democracy, but in that early democracy women and slaves were mere properties of 
male citizens. The United States has been a democracy for quite some time. Yet, 
equality between men and women is still an ongoing and unsettled battle. If one 
regards Japan as a democracy, one has to recognize that Japanese women socially fare 
far worse in many aspects than women in some non-democratic or less democratic 
societies. Democracy does not automatically promote equality between the sexes, 
and, for Confucianism, the issue of this feminist challenge has to be tackled side by 
side with that of democracy. 
There is also an internal need for Confucianism to articulate its view on women. 
This is so not only because Confucianism has not treated women well and owes a 
deep historic debt to women, but also because a philosophical system like 
Confucianism is incomplete without a clear articulation of equality or inequality 
between all human beings. Such an articulation would include a number of things. It 
would need to address the issue of whether Confucian philosophical thinking accords 
with feminist philosophical thinking in a fundamental way. It would also need to 
address how Confucianism answers feminist concerns such as sexual equality and 
other important human ideals. In a 1994 article I argued that Confucian ethical 
thinking meshes well with at least one strand of contemporary feminist ethical 
 (Li, 1994). There are three parallels between Confucian 
ethics and feminist care ethics. First, ren 仁 and care, as the highest moral ideals of 
each ethical system, share some commonality (e.g., tenderness toward others). 
Second, in contrast with Kantian and utilitarian ethics, both ren and care ethics are not 
as dependent on general rules. Third, based on their common notion of relational self, 
both ren and care ethics believe in care/love with gradations, vis-à-vis Kantian ethical 
universality. Based on these important similarities, one may argue that Confucian 
philosophy is not inherently opposed to feminist thinking; to the contrary, it has a 
solid base for making ethical claims consistent with those of feminist ethics and 
ideals.  
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To be sure, we should not overemphasize the similarities between Confucian 
ethics and feminist ethics. Any discussion of their similarities has to be done within 
the context of their significant differences. Whereas feminist care ethicists 
specifically have women in mind as they engage in their explorations, Confucian 
ssues. Classic Confucian 
thinkers virtually excluded women from the realm of philosophical exploration; 
contemporary Confucian thinkers have also largely avoided that subject. 
Nevertheless, if these similarities as identified above indeed exist, we must not 
has argued that, in some way, feminism can be seen as a radical form of 
Confucianism. Both feminism and Confucianism are concerned with such 
philosophical issues as social roles, rituals, and the formation of or revision of self. 
But their attitudes toward tradition are quite different. Confucianism pretty much 
bases itself on tradition, whereas feminism generally opts for reforming tradition 
(Kupperman, 2000). These issues may be subject to debate. But we also must realize 
that feminism is more than care ethics. There should be no doubt that more 
explorations in this area will be beneficial to the cause of Confucianism.  
The traditional Confucian view of the two genders has been that of their 
differentiation (男女有别)
namely love between parents and children, appropriateness between rulers and 
ministers, differentiation between husband and wife, order between the old and the 
young, and trust between friends. Traditionally differentiation between husband and 
wife has been interpreted as that of the nei 内 and wai 外, namely the functions 
internal and external to the household. It means that the husband is responsible for 
affairs outside home whereas the wife is responsible for affairs inside home. This 
traditional division of labor may have had justifications in ancient times. The 
population in ancient times, required a lot of physical strength (farming, taking 
merchandises to the market, etc.), and were more appropriate for men than for women. 
and leave women to affairs inside home. Today, the situation has changed 
considerably. The distinction between internal and external is largely no longer 
appropriate. Confucians should abandon this distinction and look for something more 
appropriate. 
But should Confucianism abandon differentiation between men and women 
altogether? It can be argued that some kind of differentiation should still be 
maintained. The biological fact that women give birth will not change. This fact has 
implications on the appropriate roles for the two sexes. Caution needs to be taken, 
though, not to define the differentiation between men and women to the detriment of 
women, as has been the case with Confucianism in the past. 
The issue of sexual equality is not a purely philosophical issue. It also has to do 
with society at large. Confucianism is not a pure philosophy in the Socratic sense. The 
broad scope of Confucianism equips this tradition with the capacity to tackle the issue 
of sexual equality.  
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The greatest challenge facing Confucianism today is also the ultimate one: whether 
Confucianism as a living tradition can survive into the future. This may sound 
alarming, but the issue is real. While Confucianism on its own merit facilitates its 
social influence and continuity, the fact is that for long periods in history 
Confucianism was s
Confucianism to come to the forefront of Chinese culture. It is equally true that the 
second peak of Confucianism, in the name of neo-Confucianism of the Song, Yuan 
and Ming, was greatly enhanced by the patronage of the state. Now state sponsorship 
of Confucianism has become virtually nonexistent. Throughout history Confucianism 
has faced serious challenges to its survival. The battle with Buddhism during the Tang 
dynasty may have been its first serious battle for survival; Confucianism made it. We 
have no reason to think that it will not make it again this time. But, the challenge is 
real and serous. No tradition none can take its own survival for granted. 
Confucianism has encountered three major assaults in the 20th century. The first 
as during the Cultural 
Revolution. These assaults are widely known and need no further discussion here. 
The third assault on Confucianism has not been discussed or not even recognized. For 
in the 1980s when two ideas became the dominating ideology in China. One is that 
致富光荣
Both ideas have been attributed to Deng Xiaoping. Although there is no conclusive 
evidence that Deng actually expressed the first idea in these words, there is no doubt 
philosophy is broader than these two ideas. But these two concepts are undeniably the 
most influential. Combining these two ideas, we have what may be called the 
goal in life is to get rich, and that one can use any means possible as long as such a 
goal is achieved. Such a doctrine is diametrically opposed to the Confucian belief that 
doctrine may have contributed to the economic success in the past decades in China, 
it also undeniably contributed to the recent severe moral deterioration in China. Its 
assault on Confucianism is not direct and may even not have been intentional. Its 
consequences are nevertheless the same. While efforts to revive Confucianism have 
been launched repeatedly in China, mainly in the academic realm, the social 
particularly challenging for Confucianism to renew itself.               
Challenges are often opportunities. A challenge to survival can be an opportunity 
-being largely depends on its 
successful handling of the major challenges discussed above. A tradition that does not 
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adequately respond to new challenges cannot maintain its healthy existence. There is 
also an issue of the different ways for Confucianism to continue. The first way is to 
seek sponsorship again from the state. Post-Marxist China needs its own cultural 
philosophy. Confucianism is a suitable candidate. State sponsorship would be hard to 
get if China is to be come a liberal democracy. But China may not become a liberal 
democracy. The Chinese government has in recent years shown only a restrained 
willingness to support Confucianism. It is conceivable that a moderate non-
totalitarian government rallies its people under the banner of Confucianism as its 
national heritage and spiritual foundation. The second form for Confucianism to 
revive is to take the form of a religion. There has been debate about whether 
Confucianism is a religion because it has appeared to be a borderline case on 
religiosity. In recent years, some Confucian thinkers have advocated Confucianism as 
a religion. On its positive side, this strategy has helped Confucianism to acquire a seat 
on the dialogue of world religions and has given Confucianism a platform and 
visibility on the world stage. It is not clear, however, whether Confucianism can be 
(or continue to be) a religion in this increasingly secularizing world. Unlike other 
religions today, leading Confucians today are academic scholars rather than religious 
leaders or practitioners. Without specific social organization, it is difficult to see how 
Confucianism can be a commonly practiced religion. The third possibility is for 
Confucianism to continue as a public philosophy, like liberalism or utilitarianism. As 
a public philosophy, Confucianism exerts its influence in society through its 
advocates, namely scholars and public intellectuals convinced of its value and 
validity. This would require not only the existence of some influential Confucian 
thinkers to represent the tradition on the world stage, but also a large number of 
intellectuals of the Confucian conviction, believing in and promoting Confucianism. 
In history, Confucianism has existed through the advocacy of intellectuals and people 
of various professions, with or without state sponsorship. Now its future may also 
depend on committed advocates. In order to secure Confucianism as a world public 
philosophy, Confucian thinkers need to articulate it in languages that are resonant 
with both marginalized and mainstream philosophers, not only in the language of 
Chinese studies or cultural studies, but also in the language of analytical and 
comparative philosophy. The third approach as a public philosophy does not exclude 
the first two, nor does it depend on them. It is possible for Confucianism to utilize all 
three approaches.  
Unlike the first four challenges, the fifth one is not a theoretical issue; it cannot 
be solved by theoretical explorations by Confucian thinkers. Realizing the urgency of 
actively engage themselves in searching for solutions to the first four challenges, and 
hence to better position Confucianism for the future. I believe that, in order for 
Confucianism to survive and prosper, it does not only need representative Confucian 
thinkers as its spokespersons, such as Tu Weiming and Chung-ying Cheng, but it also 
needs institutional enhancement. Perhaps an effective world organization of 
Confucianism, which is not limited to academia, would serve as a gathering point for 
contemporary Confucians and scholars of Confucianism to coordinate efforts and 
work together for their common cause of promoting 
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assessment of the five major challenges to Confucianism is correct, Confucianism still 
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